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Abstract 
In the development of Indian Buddhism we begin to see a shift away from the early 
Buddhist epistemology based in phenomenology and process metaphysics toward a type 
of event-based metaphysics. This shift began in the reductionist methodology of the 
Abhidhamma and culminated in a theory of momentariness based in rationalism and 
abstraction, rather than early Buddhist empiricism. While early Buddhism followed an 
extensional model of temporal consciousness, when methodological reductionism was 
applied to the concept of time, it necessarily resulted in a cinematic model of temporal 
consciousness like that of the Sautrāntikas or in an idea of the tri-temporal existence of 
dhammas, like that of the Sarvāstivādins. It is in the accounting of the process of karmic 
rebirth that we can most clearly see the effects of this shift. 
The development of a theory of momentariness was incorporated into the Visuddhimagga 
by Buddhaghosa.  In Buddhaghosa’s treatment of karmic rebirth, karma, particularly 
death-threshold karma, receives more emphasis in the process of rebirth than was 
previously found in the Suttas. The incorporation of “duration-less duration” via tri-
temporal existence by Buddhaghosa became necessary in order to explain karmic 
continuity in the rebirth process while retaining the concept of momentariness. 
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[Pg.1] 
Early Buddhist karma theory 
 
In early Buddhism, the karma functions descriptively to illustrate principles of causality and 
continuity in a conventional and instrumental relation to the larger process metaphysics of 
paṭiccasamuppāda, while ethical and rebirth-oriented aspects of karma theory function 
normatively to affirm the efficacy of human action in leading a moral life. Karma describes why 
the circumstances of one’s life are the way they are, while the ethical theory of karma 
demonstrates the efficacy of human action in changing one’s circumstances now and in the 
future. In addition, the relation of karma to rebirth both reaffirms the descriptive aspects of 
karmic causality and offers an avenue of escape from karma by the attainment of nibbāna.  
 
In Buddhism, karma functions as a denial of determinism and an affirmation of the 
efficacy of human action, even if it is limited by circumstances beyond one’s control. This is best 
contrasted with the complete determinism of the Ājīvikas. While Buddhism does not put forth an 
argument for complete freedom of will, it does leave space for moral action. According to the 
Buddha, Ājīvika determinism and fatalism did not provide a valid reason for living a moral life 
(D.I.47; A.I.286; M.I.517) and the Buddha explicitly rejected this view. In fact, the Buddha 
declares that Ājīvika doctrine is the worst of all doctrines specifically because it denies ‘karma, 
deed and energy’ (A.I.287) and proclaims (M.I.483) that no Ājīvika has made an end of suffering 
and that the only Ājīvika who was reborn in heaven over 99 aeons was a believer in karma 
(kammavādin). 
 
However, while early Buddhist metaphysics rejects strong determinism, it also recognises 
the role that non-intentional and external conditions play in our experience and comprehends the 
presence of limits on complete freedom of action, with karma as only one of many causal factors 
involved in the present and possible future states of the individual (S.IV.230). It is precisely in 
this undetermined, but limited, “field of action” (A.I.223) in which intention and volitional 
action can operate and from which Buddhist conceptions of karma as causality can be coherently 
ethicised. 
 
Karma as an ethical theory in Buddhism rests upon the move from karma as action to karma as 
intention (A.III.410). Bronkhorst points out (21) that ‘Buddhism psychologised the notion of 
karmic retribution’ by moving the emphasis away from deed toward an emphasis on desire and 
intention. It is this move that is the key to Buddhist soteriology. The usual Indic view of [Pg.2] 
karma as action and latent substance leads to theories of liberation through inaction to avoid 
making new karma, coupled with austerities to annihilate existing karma. In contrast, the 
Buddhist theory of karma avoids inaction and austerities by focusing on the elimination of 
mental defilement (kilesa) through psychological practice (Bronkhorst b 9-10). This is the 
essence of the Buddha’s ‘middle way’ and it accommodates an ethical and active soteriology, 
rather than one based on immobility and austerity.  
 
Karma as an ethical theory may be said to presuppose the existence of a moral order, a 
moral order best thought of as an explanatory construct rather than as a metaphysical concept 
like a moral law. While there is some canonical support for an intrinsic moral order resembling a 
western conception of poetic justice, such as the lascivious male’s three rebirths as animals that 
were to be castrated (Thig. 437-4), the effects of a karma are not to be understood as determined 
in a one-for-one fashion. Instead, they depend on the nature of the person and circumstances in 
which the karma was done (A.I.249), as part of an ‘indeterminate (yet non-random) process’ 
(Gombrich 194). It is clear from the Buddhist rejection of Ājīvika determinism in regard to 
causality that any doctrine of karma as strong ethical determinism must also be rejected. It may 
be that since karma as an ethical theory is primarily directed toward lay practitioners as a basis 
for practical morality in Buddhist society, karmic depictions of poetic justice can be taken as 
evidence of a doctrine of moral naturalism and / or as simple pedagogical instruments to teach 
ethics to lay followers of the Buddha. 
 
In the early Buddhist soteriological project, karma is seen as something to be overcome 
and ultimately rendered irrelevant with the attainment of nibbāna. In other Indian schools which 
define karma as action and the fruit of action, karma can only be annihilated through the most 
extreme forms of inaction and immobility. However, due to the Buddhist conception of karma as 
intention, karma can be rendered inoperable through a purification of the mind that results in 
actions that are free of the poisons of greed (lobha), hatred (dosa) and delusion (moha), which 
causes them to produce karma that is ‘neither dark nor bright with neither dark nor bright 
ripening, that conduces to the exhaustion of karma’ (M.I.387). 
 
The Theory of Moments and Karmic Rebirth 
 
A subtle shift away from early Buddhist process metaphysics occurred with the doctrine of 
momentariness, which developed logically from the reductionist methodology of the 
Abhidhammikas. As phenomena were reduced to dhammas, conceived of as the smallest 
perceptual building blocks of experience, there was a tendency to reconstruct them as discrete 
ultimate entities (paramattha-dhamma). Although, as Karunadasa contends (6), ‘In the Pāli 
tradition, it is only for the sake of definition and description that each dhamma is postulated as if 
it were a separate entity’, when the same logical reductionism that gave rise to dhamma theory 
was applied to time and temporality, a theory of momentariness arose. This atomistic 
momentariness of time was ultimately coupled with the conception of dhammas to form discrete, 
time-moments. This introduced a philosophical difficulty in accounting for continuity between 
dhammas conceived of in this way. Without a way of establishing continuity between these time-
moments, a great difficulty was also raised in establishing karmic continuity across lives, which 
threatened the entire soteriological project of Buddhism. 
 
A significant problem arises in putting forth a metaphysically satisfying account of the 
nature of continuity inferred from the succession of contiguous, momentary dhammas. Early 
Buddhism avoided this problem by using an extensional model of temporal consciousness 
(Kalupahana 185) which accepted one’s immediate experience as constituting a succession of 
finite temporal experiences, each with some duration over time, constituting a ‘specious present’ 
(Dainton 5.1) similar to a Whiteheadian actual entity. These ‘drops of experience, complex and 
interdependent’ (Whitehead 18, 23) can accommodate the arising and cessation of phenomena in 
a single, conscious perception of a specious present that endures through a short period of time. 
This idea of a specious present that is a product of conscious perception of the world, but which 
does not rely on the ontological status of things in the world, supports Kalupahana’s assertion 
that early Buddhism followed the ‘middle path’ regarding time, rejecting as extremes both the 
concept of absolute time and the hypothesis that time is an illusion of the intellect. Instead, the 
Buddha ‘seems to have considered time as an essential feature of the universe and the experience 
of it’ (185). 
[Pg.3] 
Likewise, in Whitehead’s  version of process metaphysics, the impossibility of perceiving 
an abstracted temporal location such as the absolute present is remedied while avoiding ‘the 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness’ by postulating an ‘enduring physical object’ (99), which is, in 
reality, a nexus of processes functioning as actual entities (occasions of experience) in time. 
Much like dhammas, these actual entities are postulated purely as logically atomized instruments 
of definition and description rather than as ultimate entities. 
 
The addition of a momentary, atomised, conception of time to the idea of dhammas as 
elementary constituents of perception logically created problems with the concept of direct 
perception of the external world and with the concept of causality. This type of momentary 
dhamma could not be said to endure over time to condition the successive dhammas that arise 
following each dhamma’s cessation without granting dhammas some form of substantiality or 
essence.  
  
            An unwillingness to grant this type of substantiality to dhammas led to a type of 
cinematic model of temporal consciousness adopted by the Sautrāntikas in which, ‘Our streams 
of consciousness are composed of continuous successions of these momentary states of 
consciousness... analogous to movies, which (as displayed) consist of rapid sequences of still 
images’ (Dainton 1.1). This is the logical result when a reductionist methodology is applied to 
the concept of time. However, this model is subject to the serious objection that a succession of 
experiences is not the same thing as an experience of succession (Ibid. 4.1). The Sautrāntikas 
maintained their commitment to the reduction of time by committing to the theory of 
representationalism rather than direct perception and to radical presentism. 
  
In contrast, the Sarvāstivādins were committed to dhammas as actual experiences of 
events in time, or even as time (Inada 173), while also being intellectually committed to the 
abstraction of momentariness. While the Sautrāntika commitment to avoiding essentialism and 
accepting momentariness resulted in radical presentism, the Sarvāstivādins resorted to the 
concept of tri-temporal existence in which the dhammas were said to exist at all three periods of 
time: past, present and future. While other schools of Indian Buddhism saw Sarvāstivādin 
commitment to the existence of dhammas in all time periods as the doctrine of substantiality 
(atta) by another name, it had the advantages of complementing the doctrine of dependant 
arising (paṭiccasamuppāda) and accounting for the perception of past and future dhammas in 
line with the theory of direct perception (Barstow 109-125). However, according to Karunadasa 
(9), the tri-temporal theory of existence introduced among the Sarvāstivādins resulted in the 
emergence of: 
 
A metaphysical dimension to the doctrine of dhammas and thus paved the way for the 
erosion of its empirical foundation. For this theory makes an empirically unverifiable 
distinction between the actual being of the dhammas as phenomena and their ideal being 
as noumena. It assumes that the substances of all dhammas persist in all the three 
divisions of time—past, present, and future—while their manifestations as phenomena 
are impermanent and subject to change. Accordingly, a dhamma actualizes itself only in 
the present moment of time, but “in essence” it continues to subsist in all the three 
temporal periods. As is well known, this resulted in the transformation of the dhamma 
theory into a svabhavavada, “the doctrine of own-nature.” It also paved the way for a 
veiled recognition, if not for a categorical assumption, of the distinction between 
substance and quality. 
 
Momentariness Enters Theravāda Buddhism 
In this paper we are primarily concerned with the appearance of momentariness in the 
Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa. We contend that Buddhaghosa brought into Theravāda 
Buddhism an essentialism that is not found in early Buddhism while dealing with the difficulty 
of establishing karmic continuity across lives. Buddhaghosa inferred continuity from contiguity 
via the rebirth-linking consciousness (paṭisandhi-viññāṇa), which is postulated as “existing” 
momentarily between the cessation of the death consciousness (cuti-citta) and the arising of 
mentality-materiality (nama-rupa) and the life-continuum consciousness (bhavaṅga-citta) at the 
moment of rebirth-linking. The existence of the rebirth-linking consciousness is a logical 
necessity for Buddhaghosa in order to explain the continuity between the processes of death and 
rebirth in keeping with the doctrine of non-substantiality. The rebirth-linking consciousness is 
inserted to avoid any troublesome gaps between existences. The bhavaṅga-citta of the new 
existence is simply classified as a resultant state of consciousness (vipaka-citta) conditioned by 
the karma [Pg.4] that in turn conditioned the rebirth-linking consciousness of the previous 
existence (Vism.341). 
 
This is an elegant philosophical explanation of how continuity is maintained across lives 
and a useful tool for meditation on this subject. It also accounts for the ability of spiritual adepts 
to recall past lives by tracing one’s continuity of subjective experience from the present existence 
back (Vism.411). Even non-Buddhist adepts are said to be able to recall past lives, but only as a 
succession of aggregates. Buddhists are said to have a more privileged insight by tracing both the 
succession of aggregates and death and rebirth-linking, while a Buddha can skip the succession 
of births and deaths in his own or another’s stream of consciousness (viññāṇa-sota) and speak of 
any particular point at will (Vism.411). Finally, Buddhaghosa is able to demonstrate the 
mechanism by which the arahant is liberated from the cycle of existence (saṃsāra), with the 
attainment of enlightenment (nibbāna) stopping the formation of another rebirth-linking 
consciousness at the cessation of the death consciousness in this lifetime (Vism.460).   
 
Buddhaghosa takes as his premise the idea that just as one conscious moment invariably 
conditions the next conscious moment in one’s present life, the death consciousness invariably 
conditions the rebirth-linking consciousness, which in turn conditions the resultant consciousness 
in exactly the same manner as in the present succession of moments (Vism.546). The entire 
system depends on this uninterrupted succession of dhammas as discrete time-moments. It is for 
this reason the common folk belief in the existence of an intermediate state (antarābhava) is also 
denied in this metaphysical system to maintain continuity (Vism.604). 
 
If one conceives of the cycle of existences as an uninterrupted succession of subjective 
experience, whether the successive experience of dhammas or Whiteheadian “actual entities”, 
the perceived gap separating the end of one existence and the beginning of the next existence 
(Vism.554) has no ontological reality (Vism.604) and is not an obstacle to explanation. 
However, in spite of acknowledging the lack of ontological reality for the perceived gap, 
Buddhaghosa cannot help but to fill the perceived gap with the rebirth-linking consciousness 
because he is committed to an acceptance of the theory of momentariness. 
 
Buddhaghosa is clear to point out that no factor is unconditioned and that rebirth is 
primarily a result of clinging, throwing one forth into renewed existence. However, in 
emphasising the effects of karma and constructions / dispositions (saṅkhāra), whether good, bad 
or indeterminate (Vism.462), as the primary drivers of existence across lives, we begin to see the 
emergence of a more essentialist metaphysics of rebirth. This is one reason why we see 
Buddhaghosa’s metaphysics attach primary importance to the karma that manifests itself before 
death, and why his four-fold classification of karmas that manifest as rebirth-linking (Vism.601) 
emphasises weighty, habitual and death-threshold karmas as distinct from other accumulated 
karmas. This is in contrast to the depiction of karma in relation to one’s overall behaviour that is 
found in the Suttas and is a direct result of the fact that, for Buddhaghosa, a particular “karma, 
sign of karma or sign of destiny”  (Vism.457) appears at the time of death as an object for the 
rebirth-linking consciousness.  
 
While there is canonical support for the idea that death-threshold karma can be 
particularly significant (M.III.214), McDermott points out (19-20) that the Buddha emphasises 
that it is the totality of a man’s character that may shape his thoughts at the moment of death. 
The idea of death-threshold karma (or weighty / habitual karmas manifesting as or influencing 
death-threshold karma) directing the rebirth process is plausible in most cases, but it fails to 
account for cases such as that where one is unconscious at the moment of death. Therefore, it is 
likely that while admitting death-threshold karma may be particularly significant, the Buddha 
emphasised it far less than Buddhaghosa does in the Visuddhimagga. We contend that this is due 
to the logical necessities found in the metaphysical systematisation in light of the acceptance of 
momentariness.  
   
Given Buddhaghosa’s commitments to momentariness and direct perception, he was 
forced to resort to Sarvāstivādin tri-temporal existence, incorporating it into his conception of 
dhammas by conceiving of dhammas as containing within them (rather than existing in), all three 
periods of time: past, present and future. Buddhaghosa accomplished this by way of the 
metaphysical postulation that material dhammas endure longer than mental dhammas, by a ratio 
of sixteen to one (Vism.614). This allowed him to assign a tri-temporal categorisation of past, 
present and future (by way of arising, persisting and ceasing) to dhammas, thus giving [Pg.5] 
them causal efficacy, while at the same time retaining the concept of dhammas as discrete 
infinitesimal time-moments. This ingenious concept had the added effect of maintaining the 
ideas of direct perception and the symmetry of time. 
 
However, this manoeuvre succeeded at the cost of ascribing misplaced concreteness in 
differentiating momentary mental dhammas from momentary material dhammas. It also called 
into question the very definition of momentariness. Essentialism necessarily emerges from this 
coupling and Buddhaghosa was forced to downplay the phenomenological and empirical 
asymmetric nature of extensional temporal causality found in early Buddhism, in which the 
present is associated with becoming (Kalupahana 186), in favour of this new essentialist 
paradigm. Although this appears to be a minor philosophical innovation undertaken in order to 
harmonise diverse doctrines, it results in a profound shift away from the early Buddhist position 
in order to incorporate a theory of momentariness. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The early Buddhist conception of dhamma avoided the temptations of essentialism arising from 
reification of the dhammas by using an extensional model of temporal consciousness that 
allowed the contents of conscious perception to extend through time, and therefore had no need 
of a theory of momentariness. It also allowed for the presence of past events in the extensional 
consciousness without according them a type of ontological existence or substantiality, resulting 
in a type of Sarvāstivādin eternalism. The early Buddhist model of temporal consciousness is in 
line with the empirical and phenomenological experience of a specious present and it avoided the 
metaphysical problems of a lack of continuity and diachronic complexity found in the cinematic 
model of temporal consciousness used by the Sautrāntikas.  
 
While it seems that Buddhaghosa was aware of the danger in attributing substance in the 
guise of own-nature to dhammas, he was less attentive to the problem of essentialism arising 
from the atomisation of time via the theory of momentariness. It was this move toward an 
analysis of existence into a succession of discrete time-moments that fundamentally transformed 
Theravāda Buddhist epistemology. Ironically, the theory of momentariness that arose in part to 
avoid essentialism and enduring substances became the vehicle by which essentialism first enters 
Theravāda thought. 
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